Tag: Military

Pyrrhic Victory: Winning the Battle, Losing the War

“War ends at the moment when peace permanently wins out. Not when the articles of surrender are signed or the last shot is fired, but when the last shout of a sidewalk battle fades, when the next generation starts to wonder whether the whole thing ever really happened.”

— Lee Sandlin

The Basics

In a classic American folktale, a stubborn railroad worker decides to prove his skill by competing with a drilling machine. John Henry, enraged to hear that machines might take his job, claims that his digging abilities are superior. A contest is arranged. He goes head to head with the new drill. The result is impressive — the drill breaks after three meters, whereas John Henry makes it to four meters in the same amount of time. As the other workers begin to celebrate his victory, he collapses and dies of exhaustion.

John Henry might have been victorious against the drill, but that small win was meaningless in the face of his subsequent death. In short, we can say that he won the battle but lost the war.

Winning a battle but losing the war is a military mental model that refers to achieving a minor victory that ultimately results in a larger defeat, rendering the victory empty or hollow. It can also refer to gaining a small tactical advantage that corresponds to a wider disadvantage.

One particular type of hollow victory is the Pyrrhic victory, which Wikipedia defines as a victory that “inflicts such a devastating toll on the victor that it is tantamount to defeat.” That devastating toll can come in the form of an enormous number of casualties, the wasting of resources, high financial costs, damage to land, and other losses. Or, in that folktale, the death of the railroad worker.

Another hollow victory occurs when you engage in a conventional war and prompt a response from an opponent who has significantly more firepower than you do. The attack on Pearl Harbor was considered a victory for the Japanese. However, by provoking an army with superior forces, they set something in motion they could not control.

While the concept of a hollow victory arises in military contexts, understanding the broader principle allows you to apply it to other areas of life. It can often be helpful in the context of non-zero-sum situations, in which both parties suffer even if one has technically succeeded.

We have won a battle but lost a war whenever we achieve some minor aim that leads to wider loss.

We have won a battle but lost a war whenever we achieve some minor (or even major) aim that leads to wider loss. We might win an argument with a partner over a small infraction, only to come across as hostile and damage the relationship. We may achieve a short-term professional goal by working overtime, only to harm our health and reduce our long-term productivity. We might pursue a particular career for the sake of money, but feel unfulfilled and miserable in the process.

“Grand strategy is the art of looking beyond the present battle and calculating ahead. It requires that you focus on your ultimate goal and plot to reach it.”

— Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War

The Original Pyrrhic Victory

The term “Pyrrhic victory” is named after the Greek king Pyrrhus of Epirus. Between 280 and 279 BC, Pyrrhus’s army managed to defeat the Romans in two major battles. Striding into Italy with 25,000 men and 20 elephants — a new sight for the Romans — Pyrrhus was confident that he could extend his empire. However, the number of lives lost in the process made the victory meaningless. According to Plutarch, Pyrrhus is said to have told a friend that another victory against the Romans would “utterly undo him.”

Pyrrhus did not have access to anywhere near enough potential recruits to replenish his army. He had, after all, lost most of his men, including the majority of his friends and commanders. Meanwhile, the Romans were only temporarily defeated. They could replace their lost soldiers with relative ease. Even worse, the two losses had enraged the Romans and made them more willing to continue fighting. The chastened king gathered his remaining troops and sailed back to Greece.

The Battle of Bunker Hill

A classic example of a Pyrrhic victory is the Battle of Bunker Hill, fought on June 17th, 1775, during the American Revolutionary War. Colonial and British troops grappled for control of the strategically advantageous Bunker Hill in Massachusetts.

Four days earlier, on June 13th, the colonial army received intelligence that the British were planning to take control of the hills around Boston, which would give them greater authority over the nearby harbor. About 1200 colonial soldiers situated themselves on the hills, while others spread throughout the surrounding area. The British army, realizing this, mounted an attack.

The British army succeeded in their aim after the colonial army ran out of ammunition. Yet the Battle of Bunker Hill was anything but a true victory, because the British lost a substantial number of men, including 100 of their officers. This left the British army depleted (having sustained 1000 casualties), low on resources, and without proper management.

This Pyrrhic victory was unexpected; the British troops had far more experience and outnumbered the colonial army by almost 2:1. The Battle of Bunker Hill sapped British morale but was somewhat motivating for the colonials, who had sustained less than half the number of casualties.

In The American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, the situation is described this way:

… the British were stopped by heavy fire from the colonial troops barricaded behind rail fences that had been stuffed with grass, hay, and brush. On the second or third advance, however, the attackers carried the redoubt and forced the surviving defenders, mostly exhausted and weaponless, to flee. …

If the British had followed this victory with an attack on Dorchester Heights to the South of Boston, it might have been worth the heavy cost. But, presumably, because of their severe losses and the fighting spirit displayed by the rebels, the British commanders abandoned or indefinitely postponed such a plan. Consequently, after Gen. George Washington took colonial command two weeks later, enough heavy guns and ammunition had been collected that he was able in March 1776 to seize and fortify Dorchester Heights and compel the British to evacuate Boston.… Also, the heavy losses inflicted on the British in the Battle of Bunker Hill bolstered the Americans’ confidence and showed that the relatively inexperienced colonists could indeed fight on par with the mighty redcoats of the British army.

In The War of the American Revolution, Robert W. Coakley writes of the impact of Bunker Hill:

Bunker Hill was a Pyrrhic victory, its strategic effect practically nil since the two armies remained in virtually the same position they had held before. Its consequences, nevertheless, cannot be ignored. A force of farmers and townsmen, fresh from their fields and shops, with hardly a semblance of orthodox military organization, had met and fought on equal terms with a professional British army. …[N]ever again would British commanders lightly attempt such an assault on Americans in fortified positions.

“I wish we could sell them another hill at the same price.”

— Nathanael Greene, leader of the colonial army

The Battle of Borodino

Fought on September 7, 1812, the Battle of Borodino was the bloodiest day of the Napoleonic Wars. The French army (led by Napoleon) sought to invade Russia. Roughly a quarter of a million soldiers fought at the Battle of Borodino, with more than 70,000 casualties. Although the French army succeeded in forcing the Russians into retreat, their victory was scarcely a triumphant one. Both sides ended up depleted and low on morale without having achieved their respective aims.

The Battle of Borodino is considered a Pyrrhic victory because the French army destroyed itself in the process of capturing Moscow. The Russians had no desire to surrender, and the conflict was more costly for the French than for their opponent.
By the time Napoleon’s men began their weary journey back to France, they had little reason to consider themselves victorious. The Battle of Borodino had no clear purpose, as no tactical advantage was gained. Infighting broke out and Napoleon eventually lost both the war and his role as leader of France.

History has shown again and again that attempting to take over Russia is rarely a good idea. Napoleon was at a serious disadvantage to begin with. The country’s size and climate made tactical movements difficult. Bringing supplies in proved nearly impossible, and the French soldiers easily succumbed to cold, starvation, and infectious diseases. Even as they hastened to retreat, the Russian army recovered its lost men quickly and continued to whittle away at the remaining French soldiers. Of the original 95,000 French troops, a mere 23,000 returned from Russia (exact figures are impossible to ascertain due to each side’s exaggerating or downplaying the losses). The Russian approach to defeating the French is best described as attrition warfare – a stubborn, unending wearing down. Napoleon might have won the Battle of Borodino, but in the process he lost everything he had built during his time as a leader and his army was crushed.

Pyrrhic victories often serve as propaganda in the long term – for the losing side, not the victors.

Something we can note from both Borodino and Bunker Hill is that Pyrrhic victories often serve as propaganda in the long term – for the losing side, not for the victors. As the adage goes, history is written by winners. A Latin saying, ad victorem spolias – to the victor belong the spoils – exemplifies this idea. Except that it doesn’t quite ring true when it comes to Pyrrhic victories, which tend to be a source of shame for the winning side. In the case of Borodino, it became an emblem of patriotism and pride for the Russians.

“[I]t is much better to lose a battle and win the war than to win a battle and lose the war. Resolve to keep your eyes on the big ball.”

— David J. Schwartz, The Magic of Thinking Big

Hollow Victories in Business

A company has won a Pyrrhic victory when it leverages all available resources to take over another company, only to be ruined by the financial costs and the loss of key employees. Businesses can also ruin themselves over lawsuits that drain resources, distract managers, and get negative attention in the press.

American Apparel is one instance of a company ending up bankrupt, partially as a result of mounting legal fees. The exact causes of the company’s downfall are not altogether understood, though a number of lawsuits are believed to have been a major factor. It began with a series of sexual harassment lawsuits against founder Dov Charney.

American Apparel’s board of directors fired Charney after the growing fees associated with defending him began harming the company’s finances (as well as its reputation). Charney responded by attempting a hostile takeover, as unwilling to surrender control of the company he founded as Czar Alexander was to surrender Moscow to Napoleon. More lawsuits followed as American Apparel shareholders and board members seemingly sued everyone in sight and were sued by suppliers, by more than 200 former employees, and by patent holders.

As everyone involved focused on winning their respective battles, the company ended up filing for bankruptcy and losing the war. In short, everyone suffered substantial losses, from Charney himself to the many factory workers who were made redundant.

Hollow Victories in Court Cases

Hollow victories are common in the legal system. For example, consider the following scenarios:

  • A divorced couple engages in a lengthy, tedious legal battle over the custody of their children. Eventually, they are given shared custody. Yet the tense confrontations associated with the court case have alienated the children from their parents and removed tens of thousands of dollars from the collective purse.
  • A man unknowingly puts up trees that slightly cross over into his neighbor’s property. The man tries to come to a compromise by perhaps trimming the trees or allowing the neighbor to cross into his property in exchange for leaving the trees up. No dice; the neighbor sticks to his guns. Unable to resolve the matter, the neighbor sues the man and wins, forcing him to cut down the trees and pay all legal expenses. While the neighbor has technically won the case, he now has an enemy next door, and enemies up and down the street who think he’s a Scrooge.
  • A freelance illustrator discovers that her work has been used without permission or payment by a non-profit group that printed her designs on T-shirts and sold them, with the proceeds going to charity. The illustrator sues them and wins for copyright infringement, but costs herself and the charity substantial legal fees. Unhappy that the illustrator sued a charity instead of making a compromise, the public boycotts her and she has trouble selling her future work.
  • A well-known business magnate discovers that his children are suing him for the release of trust fund money they believe they are owed. He counter-sues, arguing publicly that his children are greedy and don’t deserve the money. He wins the case on a legal technicality, but both his public image and his relationships with his children are tarnished. He’s kept his money, but not his happiness.

A notable instance of a legal Pyrrhic victory was the decade-long McLibel case, the longest running case in English history. The fast-food chain McDonald’s attempted to sue two environmental activists, Helen Steel and David Morris, over leaflets they distributed. McDonald’s claimed the contents of the leaflets were false. Steel and Morris claimed they were true.

Court hearings found that both parties were both wrong – some of the claims were verifiable; others were fabricated. After ten years of tedious litigation and negative media attention, McDonald’s won the case, but it was far from worthwhile. The (uncollected) £40,000 settlement they were awarded was paltry compared to the millions the legal battle had cost the company. Meanwhile, Steel and Morris chose to represent themselves and spent only £30,000 (both had limited income and did not receive Legal Aid).

Although McDonald’s did win the case, it came with enormous costs, both financially and in reputation. The case attracted a great deal of media attention as a result of its David-vs.-Goliath nature. The idea of two unemployed activists taking on an international corporation had an undeniable appeal, and the portrayals of McDonald’s were unanimously negative. The case did far more harm to their reputation than a few leaflets distributed in London would have. At one point, McDonald’s attempted to placate Steel and Morris by offering to donate money to a charity of their choice, provided that they stopped criticizing the company publicly and did so only “in private with friends.” The pair responded that they would accept the terms if McDonald’s halted any form of advertising and staff recommended it only “in private with friends.”

“Do not be ashamed to make a temporary withdrawal from the field if you see that your enemy is stronger than you; it is not winning or losing a single battle that matters, but how the war ends.”

— Paulo Coelho, Warrior of the Light

Hollow Victories in Politics

Theresa May’s General Election win is a perfect example of a political Pyrrhic victory, as is the Brexit vote the year prior.

Much like Napoleon at Borodino, David Cameron achieved his aims, only to lose his role as a leader in the process. And much like the French soldiers who defeated the Russians at Borodino, only to find themselves limping home through snow and ice, the triumphant Leave voters now face a drop in wages and general quality of life, making the fulfilment of their desire to leave the European Union seem somewhat hollow. Elderly British people (the majority of whom voted to leave) must deal with dropping pensions and potentially worse healthcare due to reduced funding. Voters won the battle but at a cost that is unknown.

Even before the shock of the Brexit vote had worn off, Britain saw a second dramatic Pyrrhic victory: Theresa May’s train-wreck General Election. Amid soaring inflation, May aimed to win a clear majority and secure her leadership. Although she was not voted out of office, her failure to receive unanimous support only served to weaken her position. Continued economic decline has weakened it further.

“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.”

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War

How We Can Avoid Hollow Victories in Our Lives

One important lesson we can learn from hollow victories is the value of focusing on the bigger picture, rather than chasing smaller goals.

One way to avoid winning a battle but losing the war is to think in terms of opportunity costs. Charlie Munger has said that “All intelligent people use opportunity cost to make decisions”; maybe what he should have said is that “All intelligent people should use opportunity cost to make decisions.”

Consider a businessman, well versed in opportunity cost economics, who chooses to work late every night instead of spending time with his family, whom he then alienates and eventually becomes distanced from. The opportunity cost of the time spent at the office between 7-10 pm wasn’t just TV, or dinner, or any other thing he would have done were he at home. It was a good long-term relationship with his wife and children! Talk about opportunity costs! Putting in the late hours may have helped him with the “battle” of business, but what about the “war” of life? Unfortunately, many people realize too late that they paid too high a price for their achievements or victories.

Hollow victories can occur as a result of a person or party focusing on a single goal – winning a lawsuit, capturing a hill, winning an election – while ignoring the wider implications. It’s like looking at the universe by peering into one small corner of space with a telescope.

As was noted earlier, this mental model isn’t relevant just in military, legal, or political contexts; hollow victories can occur in every part of our lives, including relationships, health, personal development, and careers. Understanding military tactics and concepts can teach us a great deal about being effective leaders, achieving our goals, maintaining relationships, and more.

It’s obvious that we should avoid Pyrrhic victories wherever possible, but how do we do that? In spite of situations differing vastly, there are some points to keep in mind:

  • Zoom out to see the big picture. By stepping back when we get too focused on minutiae, we can pay more attention to the war, not just the battle. Imagine that you are at the gym when you feel a sharp pain in your leg. You ignore it and finish the workout, despite the pain increasing with each rep. Upon visiting a doctor, you find you have a serious injury and will be unable to exercise until it heals. If you had focused on the bigger picture, you would have stopped the workout, preventing a minor injury from getting worse, and been able to get back to your workouts sooner.
  • Keep in mind core principles and focus on overarching goals. When Napoleon sacrificed thousands of his men in a bid to take control of Moscow, he forgot his core role as the leader of the French people. His own country should have been the priority, but he chose to chase more power and ended up losing everything. When we risk something vital – our health, happiness, or relationships – we run the risk of a Pyrrhic victory.
  • Recognize that we don’t have to lose our minds just because everyone else has. As Warren Buffett once said, “be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful.” Or, as Nathan Rothschild wrote, “great fortunes are made when cannonballs fall in the harbor, not when violins play in the ballroom.” When others are thrashing to win a battle, we would do well to pay attention to the war. What can we notice that they ignore? If we can’t (or don’t want to) resolve the turmoil, how can we benefit from it?
  • Recognize when to give up. We cannot win every battle we engage in, but we can sometimes win the war. In some situations, the optimum choice is to withdraw or surrender to avoid irreparable problems. The goal is not the quick boost from a short-term victory; it is the valuable satisfaction of long-term success.
  • Remember that underdogs can win – or at least put up a good fight. Remember what the British learned the hard way at Bunker Hill, and what it cost McDonald’s to win the McLibel case. Even if we think we can succeed against a seemingly weaker party, that victory can come at a very high cost.

***

Members can discuss this post on the Learning Community Forum

OODA LOOP: What You Can Learn from Fighter Pilots About Making Fast and Accurate Decisions

“What is strategy? A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.””

— John Boyd

What techniques do people use in the most extreme situations to make decisions? What can we learn from them to help us make more rational and quick decisions?

If these techniques work in the most drastic scenarios, they have a good chance of working for us. This is why military mental models can have such wide, useful applications outside their original context.

Military mental models are constantly tested in the laboratory of conflict. If they weren’t agile, versatile, and effective, they would quickly be replaced by others. Military leaders and strategists invest a great deal of time in developing and teaching decision-making processes.

One strategy that I’ve found repeatedly effective is the OODA loop.

Developed by strategist and U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd, the OODA loop is a practical concept designed to be the foundation of rational thinking in confusing or chaotic situations. OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.

Boyd developed the strategy for fighter pilots. However, like all good mental models, it can be extended into other fields. We used it at the intelligence agency I used to work at. I know lawyers, police officers, doctors, businesspeople, politicians, athletes, and coaches who use it.

Fighter pilots have to work fast. Taking a second too long to make a decision can cost them their lives. As anyone who has ever watched Top Gun knows, pilots have a lot of decisions and processes to juggle when they’re in dogfights (close-range aerial battles). Pilots move at high speeds and need to avoid enemies while tracking them and keeping a contextual knowledge of objectives, terrains, fuel, and other key variables.

Dogfights are nasty. I’ve talked to pilots who’ve been in them. They want the fights to be over as quickly as possible. The longer they go, the higher the chances that something goes wrong. Pilots need to rely on their creativity and decision-making abilities to survive. There is no game plan to follow, no schedule or to-do list. There is only the present moment when everything hangs in the balance.

Forty-Second Boyd

Boyd was no armchair strategist. He developed his ideas during his own time as a fighter pilot. He earned the nickname “Forty-Second Boyd” for his ability to win any fight in under 40 seconds.

In a tribute written after Boyd’s death, General C.C. Krulak described him as “a towering intellect who made unsurpassed contributions to the American art of war. Indeed, he was one of the central architects of the reform of military thought…. From John Boyd we learned about competitive decision making on the battlefield—compressing time, using time as an ally.”

Reflecting Robert Greene’s maxim that everything is material, Boyd spent his career observing people and organizations. How do they adapt to changeable environments in conflicts, business, and other situations?

Over time, he deduced that these situations are characterized by uncertainty. Dogmatic, rigid theories are unsuitable for chaotic situations. Rather than trying to rise through the military ranks, Boyd focused on using his position as colonel to compose a theory of the universal logic of war.

Boyd was known to ask his mentees the poignant question, “Do you want to be someone, or do you want to do something?” In his own life, he certainly focused on the latter path and, as a result, left us ideas with tangible value. The OODA loop is just one of many.

The Four Parts of the OODA Loop

Let’s break down the four parts of the OODA loop and see how they fit together.

OODA stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. The description of it as a loop is crucial. Boyd intended the four steps to be repeated again and again until a conflict finishes. Although most depictions of the OODA loop portray it as a superficial idea, there is a lot of depth to it. Using it should be simple, but it has a rich basis in interdisciplinary knowledge.

1: Observe
The first step in the OODA Loop is to observe. At this stage, the main focus is to build a comprehensive picture of the situation with as much accuracy as possible.

A fighter pilot needs to consider: What is immediately affecting me? What is affecting my opponent? What could affect us later on? Can I make any predictions, and how accurate were my prior ones? A pilot’s environment changes rapidly, so these observations need to be broad and fluid.

And information alone is not enough. The observation stage requires awareness of the overarching meaning of the information. It also necessitates separating the information which is relevant for a particular decision from that which is not. You have to add context to the variables.

The observation stage is vital in decision-making processes.

For example, faced with a patient in an emergency ward, a doctor needs to start by gathering as much foundational knowledge as possible. That might be the patient’s blood pressure, pulse, age, underlying health conditions, and reason for admission. At the same time, the doctor needs to discard irrelevant information and figure out which facts are relevant for this precise situation. Only by putting the pieces together can she make a fast decision about the best way to treat the patient. The more experienced a doctor is, the more factors she is able to take into account, including subtle ones, such as a patient’s speech patterns, his body language, and the absence (rather than presence) of certain signs.

2: Orient

Orientation, the second stage of the OODA loop, is frequently misunderstood or skipped because it is less intuitive than the other stages. Boyd referred to it as the schwerpunkt, a German term which loosely translates to “the main emphasis.” In this context, to orient is to recognize the barriers that might interfere with the other parts of the process.

Without an awareness of these barriers, the subsequent decision cannot be a fully rational one. Orienting is all about connecting with reality, not with a false version of events filtered through the lens of cognitive biases and shortcuts.

“Orientation isn’t just a state you’re in; it’s a process. You’re always orienting.”

— John Boyd

Including this step, rather than jumping straight to making a decision, gives us an edge over the competition. Even if we are at a disadvantage to begin with, having fewer resources or less information, Boyd maintained that the Orient step ensures that we can outsmart an opponent.

For Western nations, cyber-crime is a huge threat — mostly because for the first time ever, they can’t outsmart, outspend, or out-resource the competition. Boyd has some lessons for them.

Boyd believed that four main barriers prevent us from seeing information in an unbiased manner:

  1. Our cultural traditions
  2. Our genetic heritage
  3. Our ability to analyze and synthesize
  4. The influx of new information — it is hard to make sense of observations when the situation keeps changing

Boyd was one of the first people to discuss the importance of building a toolbox of mental models, prior to Charlie Munger’s popularization of the concept among investors.

Boyd believed in “destructive deduction” — taking note of incorrect assumptions and biases and then replacing them with fundamental, versatile mental models. Only then can we begin to garner a reality-oriented picture of the situation, which will inform subsequent decisions.

Boyd employed a brilliant metaphor for this — a snowmobile. In one talk, he described how a snowmobile comprises elements of different devices. The caterpillar treads of a tank, skis, the outboard motor of a boat, the handlebars of a bike — each of those elements is useless alone, but combining them creates a functional vehicle.

As Boyd put it: “A loser is someone (individual or group) who cannot build snowmobiles when facing uncertainty and unpredictable change; whereas a winner is someone (individual or group) who can build snowmobiles, and employ them in an appropriate fashion, when facing uncertainty and unpredictable change.”

To orient ourselves, we have to build a metaphorical snowmobile by combining practical concepts from different disciplines.

Although Boyd is regarded as a military strategist, he didn’t confine himself to any particular discipline. His theories encompass ideas drawn from various disciplines, including mathematical logic, biology, psychology, thermodynamics, game theory, anthropology, and physics. Boyd described his approach as a “scheme of pulling things apart (analysis) and putting them back together (synthesis) in new combinations to find how apparently unrelated ideas and actions can be related to one another.”

3. Decide

No surprises here. Having gathered information and oriented ourselves, we have to make an informed decision. The previous two steps should have generated a plethora of ideas, so this is the point where we choose the most relevant option.

Boyd cautioned against first-conclusion bias, explaining that we cannot keep making the same decision again and again. This part of the loop needs to be flexible and open to Bayesian updating. In some of his notes, Boyd described this step as the hypothesis stage. The implication is that we should test the decisions we make at this point in the loop, spotting their flaws and including any issues in future observation stages.

4. Act

While technically a decision-making process, the OODA loop is all about action. The ability to act upon rational decisions is a serious advantage.

The other steps are mere precursors. A decision made, now is the time to act upon it. Also known as the test stage, this is when we experiment to see how good our decision was. Did we observe the right information? Did we use the best possible mental models? Did we get swayed by biases and other barriers? Can we disprove the prior hypothesis? Whatever the outcome, we then cycle back to the first part of the loop and begin observing again.

Why the OODA Loop Works

The OODA loop has four key benefits.

1. Speed

Fighter pilots must make many decisions in fast succession. They don’t have time to list pros and cons or to consider every available avenue. Once the OODA loop becomes part of their mental toolboxes, they should be able to cycle through it in a matter of seconds.

Speed is a crucial element of military decision making. Using the OODA loop in everyday life, we probably have a little more time than a fighter pilot would. But Boyd emphasized the value of being decisive, taking initiative, and staying autonomous. These are universal assets and apply to many situations.

Take the example of modern growth hacker marketing.

“The ability to operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold the adversary back inside himself so that he can neither appreciate nor keep up with what is going on. He will become disoriented and confused…”

— John Boyd

The key advantage growth hackers have over traditional marketers is speed. They observe (look at analytics, survey customers, perform a/b tests, etc.) and orient themselves (consider vanity versus meaningful metrics, assess interpretations, and ground themselves in the reality of a market) before making a decision and then acting. The final step serves to test their ideas and they have the agility to switch tactics if the desired outcome is not achieved.

Meanwhile, traditional marketers are often trapped in lengthy campaigns which do not offer much in the way of useful metrics. Growth hackers can adapt and change their techniques every single day depending on what works. They are not confined by stagnant ideas about what worked before.

So, although they may have a small budget and fewer people to assist them, their speed gives them an advantage. Just as Boyd could defeat any opponent in under 40 seconds (even starting at a position of disadvantage), growth hackers can grow companies and sell products at extraordinary rates, starting from scratch.

2. Comfort With Uncertainty
Uncertainty does not always equate to risk. A fighter pilot is in a precarious situation, where there will be gaps in their knowledge. They cannot read the mind of the opponent and might have incomplete information about the weather conditions and surrounding environment. They can, however, take into account key factors such as the opponent’s nationality, the type of airplane they are flying, and what their maneuvers reveal about their intentions and level of training.

If the opponent uses an unexpected strategy, is equipped with a new type of weapon or airplane, or behaves in an irrational, ideologically motivated way, the pilot must accept the accompanying uncertainty. However, Boyd belabored the point that uncertainty is irrelevant if we have the right filters in place.

If we don’t, we can end up stuck at the observation stage, unable to decide or act. But if we do have the right filters, we can factor uncertainty into the observation stage. We can leave a margin of error. We can recognize the elements which are within our control and those which are not.

Three key principles supported Boyd’s ideas. In his presentations, he referred to Gödel’s Proof, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Gödel’s theorems indicate that any mental model we have of reality will omit certain information and that Bayesian updating must be used to bring it in line with reality. Our understanding of science illustrates this.

In the past, people’s conception of reality missed crucial concepts such as criticality, relativity, the laws of thermodynamics, and gravity. As we have discovered these concepts, we have updated our view of the world. Yet we would be foolish to think that we now know everything and our worldview is complete. Other key principles remain undiscovered. The same goes for fighter pilots — their understanding of what is going on during a battle will always have gaps. Identifying this fundamental uncertainty gives it less power over us.

The second concept Boyd referred to is Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. In its simplest form, this principle describes the limit of the precision with which pairs of physical properties can be understood. We cannot know the position and the velocity of a body at the same time. We can know either its location or its speed, but not both. Although Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle was initially used to describe particles, Boyd’s ability to combine disciplines led him to apply it to planes. If a pilot focuses too hard on where an enemy plane is, they will lose track of where it is going and vice versa. Trying harder to track the two variables will actually lead to more inaccuracy! Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle applies to myriad areas where excessive observation proves detrimental. Reality is imprecise.

Finally, Boyd made use of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In a closed system, entropy always increases and everything moves towards chaos. Energy spreads out and becomes disorganized.

Although Boyd’s notes do not specify the exact applications, his inference appears to be that a fighter pilot must be an open system or they will fail. They must draw “energy” (information) from outside themselves or the situation will become chaotic. They should also aim to cut their opponent off, forcing them to become a closed system. Drawing on his studies, Boyd developed his Energy Maneuverability theory, which recast maneuvers in terms of the energy they used.

“Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”

— Sun Tzu

3. Unpredictability

Using the OODA loop should enable us to act faster than an opponent, thereby seeming unpredictable. While they are still deciding what to do, we have already acted. This resets their own loop, moving them back to the observation stage. Keep doing this, and they are either rendered immobile or forced to act without making a considered decision. So, they start making mistakes, which can be exploited.

Boyd recommended making unpredictable changes in speed and direction, and wrote, “we should operate at a faster tempo than our adversaries or inside our adversaries[’] time scales. … Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (non predictable) [and] thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries.” He even helped design planes better equipped to make those unpredictable changes.

For the same reason that you can’t run the same play 70 times in a football game, rigid military strategies often become useless after a few uses, or even one iteration, as opponents learn to recognize and counter them. The OODA loop can be endlessly used because it is a formless strategy, unconnected to any particular maneuvers.

We know that Boyd was influenced by Sun Tzu (he owned seven thoroughly annotated copies of The Art of War), and he drew many ideas from the ancient strategist. Sun Tzu depicts war as a game of deception where the best strategy is that which an opponent cannot pre-empt. Apple has long used this strategy as a key part of their product launches. Meticulously planned, their launches are shrouded in secrecy and the goal is for no one outside the company to see a product prior to the release.

When information has been leaked, the company has taken serious legal action as well as firing associated employees. We are never sure what Apple will put out next (just search for “Apple product launch 2017” and you will see endless speculation based on few facts). As a consequence, Apple can stay ahead of their rivals.

Once a product launches, rival companies scramble to emulate it. But by the time their technology is ready for release, Apple is on to the next thing and has taken most of the market share. Although inexpensive compared to the drawn-out product launches other companies use, Apple’s unpredictability makes us pay attention. Stock prices rise the day after, tickets to launches sell out in seconds, and the media reports launches as if they were news events, not marketing events.

4. Testing

A notable omission in Boyd’s work is any sort of specific instructions for how to act or which decisions to make. This is presumably due to his respect for testing. He believed that ideas should be tested and then, if necessary, discarded.

“We can’t just look at our own personal experiences or use the same mental recipes over and over again; we’ve got to look at other disciplines and activities and relate or connect them to what we know from our experiences and the strategic world we live in.”

— John Boyd

Boyd’s OODA is a feedback loop, with the outcome of actions leading back to observations. Even in Aerial Attack Study, his comprehensive manual of maneuvers, Boyd did not describe any particular one as superior. He encouraged pilots to have the widest repertoire possible so they could select the best option in response to the maneuvers of an opponent.

We can incorporate testing into our decision-making processes by keeping track of outcomes in decision journals. Boyd’s notes indicate that he may have done just that during his time as a fighter pilot, building up the knowledge that went on to form Aerial Attack Study. Rather than guessing how our decisions lead to certain outcomes, we can get a clear picture to aid us in future orientation stages. Over time, our decision journals will reveal what works and what doesn’t.

Applying the OODA Loop

In sports, there is an adage that carries over to business quite well: “Speed kills.” If you are able to be nimble, able to assess the ever-changing environment and adapt quickly, you’ll always carry the advantage over your opponent.

Start applying the OODA loop to your day-to-day decisions and watch what happens. You’ll start to notice things that you would have been oblivious to before. Before jumping to your first conclusion, you’ll pause to consider your biases, take in additional information, and be more thoughtful of consequences.

As with anything you practice,  if you do it right, the more you do it, the better you’ll get.  You’ll start making better decisions more quickly. You’ll see more rapid progress. And as John Boyd would prescribe, you’ll start to DO something in your life, and not just BE somebody.

***

Members can discuss this post on the Learning Community Forum

The Relationship Between Design and Planning

QR_design_spagetti

While I’m not all that interested in military doctrine and tactics in and of themselves, I am interested in complex systems, how the weak win wars, and the lessons military leaders offer (for example, see the lessons of William McRaven and Stanley McChrystal).

This is how I found myself flipping through The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which was written to facilitate a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns.

There was a fascinating section on the difference between designing and planning that caused me to pause and reflect.

While both activities seek to formulate ways to bring about preferable futures, they are cognitively different. Planning applies established procedures to solve a largely understood problem within an accepted framework. Design inquires into the nature of a problem to conceive a framework for solving that problem. In general, planning is problem solving, while design is problem setting. Where planning focuses on generating a plan—a series of executable actions—design focuses on learning about the nature of an unfamiliar problem.

When situations do not conform to established frames of reference — when the hardest part of the problem is figuring out what the problem is—planning alone is inadequate and design becomes essential. In these situations, absent a design process to engage the problem’s essential nature, planners default to doctrinal norms; they develop plans based on the familiar rather than an understanding of the real situation. Design provides a means to conceptualize and hypothesize about the underlying causes and dynamics that explain an unfamiliar problem. Design provides a means to gain understanding of a complex problem and insights towards achieving a workable solution.

To better understand the multifaceted problems many of us face today it helps to talk with people who have different perspectives. This helps achieve better situational understanding. At best this can point the way to solutions and at worst this should help with learning what to avoid.

Often we skip the information gathering phase because it’s a lot of work. A lot of conversations. However this process helps us become informed, rather than just opinionated.

The underlying premise is this: when participants achieve a level of understanding such that the situation no longer appears complex, they can exercise logic and intuition effectively. As a result, design focuses on framing the problem rather than developing courses of action.

Just as you can never step in the same river twice, design is not something you do once and walk away. It’s an ongoing inquiry into the nature of problems and the various factors and relationships to help improve understanding. Constantly assessing the situation from a design perspective, helps gauge the effectiveness of the planning and subsequent actions. If you don’t periodically reassess the situation, you might be solving a problem that no longer exists.

The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual is full of other thought-provoking content.

(image source)