“It goes without saying that such a professional ethics is not restricted to craftsmen and artisans and members of a profession. In the Stoic’s opinion, business too has an ethics of its own. To make as much money as one needs is fair but to steal it from another what is his is against the human law, said Chrysippus (one of the main Stoics); and in the famous debate between Antipater and Diogenes the rights of the seller and the buyer are scrutinized: must the seller point out all of the faults of his wares? Is he obliged to live up only to the laws of the country in which he happens to do business or must he always be mindful of the common nature of man and the common natural law that protects all?
The source for that was Cicero’s De Officiis III and the questions are fascinating because they call into question our role … as an individual and as a member of society. What do the Stoics feel we should do when the useful conflicts with the honorable?
Here are Cicero’s words on the relevant passage.
“As an example of situations of this kind, let us assume that a good man has shipped a large cargo of corn from Alexandria to Rhodes at a time when the Rhodians were suffering shortage and hunger, and grain was extremely expensive. Assume too that he knew that several merchants had put out from Alexandria, and that he saw their ships laden with corn on course making for Rhodes. Should he report this to the Rhodians, or without divulging the fact, sell his own cargo at the highest possible price? I am assuming that he is wise and honest; the question I pose concerns the debate and discussion he has with himself, for he would not conceal the news from the Rhodians if he thought this dishonest, but he would be uncertain whether it was dishonest or not.
In such cases as this Diogenes of Babylonia, the eminent and austere Stoic, takes a different line from that of his pupil Antipater, a most incisive thinker. Antipater believes that all the facts should be divulged, so that the buyer is kept unaware of absolutely nothing which is known to the seller. Diogenes on the other hand believes that the seller is obliged to report any defects in his goods, in so far as the civil law prescribes, and to conduct the transaction otherwise without chicanery, but since he has goods to sell, he should sell them at the best possible price.
“I have shipped them, and I have set out my stall; I charge no more for my goods than anyone else does.” My price may even be lower when stocks are more plentiful. Who is getting a bad deal?”
Antipater mounts the opposing argument. “Are you serious? Your duty is to have the interest of men at heart, and to promote human fellowship. From birth you were bound by the law of nature and you inherit her principles which you are to obey and observe. They prescribe that your interest is the interest of the community, and conversely, the interest of the community is yours. So will you conceal from your fellow men the availability and abundance which they have at hand?”
Diogenes will perhaps respond: “Concealment is one thing, and silence is another. At this moment I do not conceal anything from you by failing to inform you of the nature of the gods or the highest good, knowledge of which would be of greater value to you than wheat at a low price. I am under no obligation to tell you what it is in your interest to hear.”
“On the contrary,” Antipater, will say, “you are under an obligation, for you recall that nature has joined all men in alliance.”
“I do recall that,” Diogenes will reply, “but the alliance you mention is surely not the kind that forbids a man to possess anything of his own If it does so forbid, then nothing should be put up for sale at all; everything should be given away.”
In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, “Though this is dishonorable, I will do it because it is in my interest.” Rather, the one side argues that the action is advantageous without being dishonorable, and the other argues that it should not be performed because it is dishonorable.
The answer, then seems to be that … concealment is not just reticence, for by it you seek to further your own interests by ensuring that your knowledge remains hidden from those who would benefit from it. Is there anyone who does not see the nature of this kind of concealment, and the sort of man who practices it? He is certainly not an open or straightforward person, decent, or just, or honest; on the contrary, he is crafty, devious, sharp, deceitful, malicious, cunning, wily, and artful.
Technology is starting to make this sort of information asymmetry harder. Today, the Rhodians, would know there were more ships on the way, how much grain they held, and when they’d arrive. This, argues Daniel Pink, changes how we sell.
The Stoic way of life is the expression that encompasses the Stoic’s attitude toward practical affairs. It really is “an anachronism,” writes Ludwig Edelstein in his book The Meaning of Stoicism.
It was Pythagoras who first taught a “way of life.” The Stoics usually speak of an “art of life,” an ars vivendi, not in the sense of any inspirational action but in the sense of a settled disposition, which makes man act with the certainty of an accomplished craftsman, which teaches him how to do things in an unvarying order.
From the very beginning Stoic teaching was interested in man in the context of his community.
Perhaps it is true that classical ethics taught man how to shape himself, that is, to shape his being as an artist shapes a statue. The harmonious personality was the aim of Epicurus also. Yet one often gets the impression that these ancient moralists thought of man as if he were isolated from others. This is not so of the Stoic, for whom man is a social being and can perfect himself only within the community of man and not just the community of citizens either. The highest ideal of the Stoic way of life, therefore, was to live with others. While it was the dream of the Epicurean sage to live hidden from the world, it was the duty of the Stoic sage to understand that he could never consider himself a private individual. Social obligations take precedence over individual tasks, and individual ethics is ipso facto social ethics. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Stoicism exercised such profound influence on Christianity.
*** Family Life
Generally speaking we owe much to Stoic ethics as they “imbued man’s actions with a new respect for human dignity.” For example, the Stoa first recognized the equality of husband and wife. They also believed that children were free to choose their own path and that slaves were people. At the time, these beliefs cut through the established Greek philosophical guard.
Not only did they hold that men and women have one virtue and that beyond and above the manly virtues there are human virtues which are valid for both men and women, but they considered matrimony to be much more than a community of the body, to be a community of the soul. The wife is the husband’s other self, his truest friend. He will, therefore, not marry for money or for family connections or even for beauty. What is important about married life is what contributes to the human qualities of both partners, the use of their common life. Nothing is further from the stoic attitude … than the point of view expressed by Shakespeare’s Petruchio “I will be master of what is my own; she is my goods, my chattels.”
Thus the first step is taken in acknowledging the dignity, the rights, and the humanity of the other person; and what is true of the husband’s attitude toward his wife is true also of his attitude toward his children. Their rights must be respected and especially their right to educate themselves and choose their own way of life. When Epictetus was confronted by a son who did not have his father’s permission to study philosophy, he was not afraid to defend the son against the father. The father’s rights and prerogatives are limited by the rights of the son, or rather the obligations of the one as well as of the other must be respected.
So what of slaves then?
This respect for the inalienable and indefeasible rights of the individual appears most clearly in the attitude prescribed with respect to the slave, the third member of the family in addition to parents and children. The slave, said Chrysippus, is a man hired for life. Slavery is nothing but subordination to the master; if it turns into possession of the slave by the master, it is lordship, and this is evil. As human beings, free men and slaves are equals.
*** The Workman
The Stoic defense of the workman, or laborer, is fascinating. The prevailing view at the time was that work was not disgraceful or dishonorable, it was a necessity. This necessity however gave you a free pass on virtue because you were, in effect, a servant of others. The Stoa changed this view and in the process created a precursor to professional ethics.
Whether or not the preclassical centuries were free of contempt for manual labour, by the end of the classical era it had become something contemptible in democratic and oligarchical societies alike. Socrates’ defence of the workman on the ground that work brings neither disgrace nor dishonor is quite revolutionary, and so is the Pythagorean theory of work and workmanship. What is much more characteristic of the common attitude is Aristotle’s remark that the artisan is subject to limited servitude while the slave is subject to unlimited servitude. Between the two, then, there is only a difference of degree. Surely, in all early centuries there is no idealization of work as such. It is considered to be a dire necessity rather than an ennobling activity; and, most important, it precludes man from practicing moral virtue.
Stoic philosophy attributed to work a value of its own, however. Work is a natural human occupation and does not exclude man from a virtuous life; it is compatible with the moral order and forms a part of it, for morality can be realized not merely in performing the duties of the citizen but also in any other human action. Aristotle had allowed that workmanship may be noble or ignoble depending on the degree of virtue that it requires as an accessory; but he had declined even to discuss the question in detail in his Politics because that would be ungentlemanlike. For the Stoa it was axiomatic that in whatever station man may find himself it is possible for him to live up to moral rules.
… In terms of economic theory it means that the arts and crafts are no longer distinguished as less noble than the possession of wealth. Worker and capitalist are on the same level, so to speak. The relation between them becomes that of two rich men, equally independent, making use of their wealth, the wealth of the one being his skill or manual strength and the wealth of the other his money. There is also a change in the attitude toward the product of wealth and toward the worker. The classical age was concerned only with technical proficiency in the artist and with the product of his art or craft. Now the human qualities of that craftsman, his inner relation to his achievement and to his customer, his reliability, his wish to do right in the widest sense of the term, are made the main content of appreciation. This point is especially important. Aristotle can still put the aporia: will it not be necessary for artisans to have virtue, since they frequently fall short in their tasks owing to intemperance? But he decides that nothing can be done about this. While the owner of a slave is educated and becomes virtuous, the artisan who lives in limited slavery is outside the control of his employer; his virtue is personal concern.
Through Stoic teaching, work is moralized, however. A sense of responsibility toward it is enjoined upon everybody. How one behaves in the performance of one’s work is no longer a matter of indifference. The more character must, so to speak, shine through one’s doings; Soberness and temperance must shine through every activity. Thus an ethos of work and workmanship arises, unknown before or known at most to the political theorist who can speak of the official as a servant of the state or of the law.
Most important perhaps, the rehabilitation and the reshaping of men’s attitude toward manual work eventually leads to a more general theory of calling or vocation. The classical age knew nothing of what can be properly called professional ethics. That is, it was not understood that each profession imposes specific duties. For example, the physician must help his patient, be he free or slave, friend or enemy, and on no condition is he permitted to do any harm. The judge is not allowed to show favor to anybody, not even to the friend who may appear before him; impartiality is his specific virtue. These duties are imposed upon the member of the profession by the role he plays in life.
In the Stoic’s opinion, business too has an ethics of its own. To make as much money as one needs is fair but to steal from another what is his is against the human law, said Chrysippus (one of the main Stoics).
… Stoic philosophy initiated a reversal of the attitude of the wealthy to the poor and infused the ideal of humaneness with the virtue of generosity. …
Generally speaking, the thesis of the Stoics was that he who has money does not have it for himself, does not possess it or own it anymore than he owns his wife or his children or anything else. You have money for the benefit of your children, of your relations, of your friends, or the state, say Seneca. The rich man, to put it succinctly, is but the trustee of his wealth. Such a position was maintained by the Stoics without in any way casting doubt on the right of private property. Private property is a natural good; it is guaranteed by justice, which gives to everybody his own. The world is a theater with different seats, and one must not complain if one does not sit in the front row nor claim that one has a right to do so. Rights differ as men differ. The Stoa, therefore, opposed socialism and communism as they were preached in Hellenistic utopias, but it does not condone a theory of the laissez faire, to which Aristotle had already objected.
The Stoics were not exactly for the invisible hand either. Their approach, built on the foundation of community, is worth visiting, and learning from.
[T]hey asked the individual to learn that it is necessary for him to live for others and that he is born for human society at large, of which he must always feel himself to be a member rather than a fragment separated off. Here in humanity and not in the state, in the moral company of man, he is truly at home. He must take care of present and future as far as social problems are concerned; and the greatest sin of a human being is to say après nous le Déluge or, as the Stoics put it in the familiar words of a Greek poet, “it is wicked and inhuman for men to declare that they care not if when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues.”