Tag: Cognitive Dissonance

Why Do People Choose Political Loyalties Over Facts?

One of the theories is cognitive dissonance—we find it difficult to hold contradictory ideas in our head at the same time. Cognitive dissonance predicts that given the choice between our emotional ties and facts, we’ll pick emotional every time. Facts lose.

When Democrats hear the argument that the president can do something about high gas prices, that produces dissonance because it clashes with the loyalties these voters feel toward Obama. The same thing happens when Republicans hear that Obama cannot be held responsible for high gas prices — the information challenges their dislike of the president.

Nyhan and Reifler hypothesized that partisans reject such information not because they’re against the facts, but because it’s painful. That notion suggested a possible solution: If partisans were made to feel better about themselves — if they received a little image and ego boost — could this help them more easily absorb the “blow” of information that threatens their pre-existing views?

Nyhan said that ongoing — and as yet, unpublished — research was showing the technique could be effective. The researchers had voters think of times in their lives when they had done something very positive and found that, fortified by this positive memory, voters were more willing to take in information that challenged their pre-existing views.

“One person talked about taking care of his elderly grandmother — something you wouldn’t expect to have any influence on people’s factual beliefs about politics,” Nyhan said. “But that brings to mind these positive feelings about themselves, which we think will protect them or inoculate them from the threat that unwelcome ideas or unwelcome information might pose to their self-concept.”

Source

The Ben Franklin Effect

Ben Franklin discovered that a person who has done someone a favor is more likely to do that person another favor than they would be had they received a favor. Or, as Franklin put it: “He that has once done you a Kindness will be more ready to do you another, than he whom you yourself have obliged.” This simple technique can be used to gain your favor or create a sense of indebt to others.

Cognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs whenever a person holds two cognitions (ideas, beliefs, attitudes, or opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent.

Dissonance produces an uncomfortable mental state the mind needs to resolve. In resolving dissonance our minds trend towards self-justification which makes it hard to admit mistakes.

Dissonance is a very powerful effect. In the case of the Ben Franklin effect, the dissonance is caused by the subjects’ negative attitude to the other person contrasted with the knowledge they did that person a favor. The easiest way to rationalize why we did someone a favor is to say “that person is not so bad after all.”

In his autobiography, Franklin explains how he curried favor by manipulating a rival legislator when he served in the Pennsylvania legislature in the 18th century:

“Having heard that he had in his library a certain very scarce and curious book, I wrote a note to him, expressing my desire of perusing that book, and requesting he would do me the favour of lending it to me for a few days. He sent it immediately, and I return’d it in about a week with another note, expressing strongly my sense of the favour. When we next met in the House, he spoke to me (which he had never done before), and with great civility; and he ever after manifested a readiness to serve me on all occasions, so that we became great friends, and our friendship continued to his death.”

Still curious? Read more about The Reciprocation Bias.

James March: The Ambiguities of Experience

In his book, The Ambiguities of Experience, James March explores the role of experience in creating intelligence.

Folk wisdom both trumpets the significance of experience and warns of its inadequacies.

On one hand, experience is thought to be the best teacher. On the other hand, experience is described as the teacher of fools, of those unable or unwilling to learn from accumulated knowledge. There is no need to learn everything yourself.

The disagreement between those aphorisms reflects profound questions about the human pursuit of intelligence through learning from experience.

“Since experience in organizations often suffers from weak signals, substantial noise, and small samples, it is quite likely that realized history will deviate considerably from underlying reality.”

— James March

March convincingly argues that although individuals and organizations are eager to derive intelligence from experience, the inferences stemming from that eagerness are often misguided.

The problems lie partly in errors in how people think, but even more so in properties of experience that confound learning from it. ‘Experience,’ March concludes, ‘may possibly be the best teacher, but it is not a particularly good teacher.’

Here are some of my notes from the book:

  • Intelligence normally entails two interrelated but somewhat different components. The first involves effective adaptation to an environment. The second: the elegance of interpretations of the experiences of life.
  • Since experience in organizations often suffers from weak signals, substantial noise, and small samples, it is quite likely that realized history will deviate considerably from the underlying reality.
  • Agencies write standards because experience is a poor teacher.
  • Constant exposure to danger without its realization leaves human beings less concerned about what once terrified them, and therefore experience can have the paradoxical effect of having people learn to feel more immune than they should to the unlikely dangers that surround them.
  • Generating an explanation of history involves transforming the ambiguities and complexities of experience into a form that is elaborate enough to elicit interest, simple enough to be understood, and credible enough to be accepted. The art of storytelling involves a delicate balancing of those three criteria
  • Humans have limited capabilities to store and recall history. They are sensitive to reconstructed memories that serve current beliefs and desires. They conserve belief by being less critical of evidence that seems to confirm prior beliefs than of evidence that seems to disconfirm them. They destroy both observations and beliefs in order to make them consistent. They prefer simple causalities, ideas that place causes and effects close to one another and that match big effects with big causes. 
  • The key effort is to link experience with a pre-existent accepted storyline so as to achieve a subjective sense of the understanding.
  • Experience is rooted in a complicated causal system that can be described adequately only by a description that is too complex for the human mind. The more accurately reality is reflected, the less comprehensible the story, and the more comprehensible the story, the less realistic it is.
  • Storytellers have their individual sources and biases, but they have to gain acceptance of their stories by catering to their audiences.
  • Despite the complications in extracting reality from experience, or perhaps because of them, there is a tendency for the themes of stories of management to converge over time.
  • Organizational stories and models are built particularly around four main mythic themes: rationality (the idea that the human spirit finds definitive expression through taking and justifying action in terms of its future consequences for prior values); hierarchy (the ideas that problems and actions can be decomposed into nested sets of subproblems and sub-actions such that interactions among them can be organized within a hierarchy); individual leader significance (the idea that any story of history must be related to a human project in order to be meaningful and that organizational human history is produced by the intentions of specific human leaders); and historical efficiency (the idea that history follows a path leading to a unique equilibrium defined by antecedent conditions and produced by competition.
  • Underlying many of these myths is a grand myth of human significance: the idea that humans can, through their individual and collective intelligence actions, influence the course of history to their advantage.
  • The myth of human significance produces the cruelties and generosities stemming from the human inclination to assign credit and blame for events to human intention.
  • There is an overwhelming tendency in American life to lionize or pillory the people who stand at the helms of our large institutions -to offer praise or level blame for outcomes over which they may have little control.
  • An experienced scholar is less inclined to claim originality than is a beginner.
  • …processes of adaptation can eliminate sources of error but are inefficient in doing so.
  • Knowledge is lost through turnover, forgetting, and misfiling, which assure that at any point there is considerable ignorance. Something that was once known is no longer known. In addition, knowledge is lost through its incomplete accessibility.
  • A history of success leads managers to a systematic overestimation of the prospects for success in novel endeavors. If managers attribute their success to talent when they are, in fact, a joint consequence of talent and good fortune, successful managers will come to believe that they have capabilities for beating the odds in the future as they apparently have had in the past.
  • In a competitive world of promises, winning projects are systematically projects in which hopes exceed reality
  • The history of organizations cycling between centralization and decentralization is a tribute, in part, to the engineering difficulty of finding an enduring balance between the short-run and local costs and the long-run and more global benefits of boundaries.
  • The vividness of direct experience leads learners to exaggerate the information content of personal experience relative to other information.
  • The ambiguities of experience take many forms but can be summarized in terms of five attributes: 1) the causal structure of experience is complex; 2) experience is noisy; 3) history includes numerous examples of endogeneity, causes in which the properties of the world are affected by actions adapting to it; 4) history as it is known is constructed by participants and observers; 5) history is miserly in providing experience. It offers only small samples and thus large sampling error in the inferences formed.
  • Experience often appears to increase significantly the confidence of successful managers in their capabilities without greatly expanding their understanding.

Still interested? Want to know more? Buy the book. Read Does Experience Make you an Expert? next. 

Can one person successfully play different roles that require different, and often competing, perspectives?

No, according to research by Max Bazerman, author of the best book on decision making I’ve ever read: Judgment in Managerial Decision Making.

Contrary to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s famous quote, “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function,” evidence suggests that even the most intelligent find it difficult to sustain opposing beliefs without the two influencing each other.

Why?

One reason is a bias from incentives. Another is bounded awareness. The auditor who desperately wants to retain a client’s business may have trouble adopting the perspective of a dispassionate referee when it comes time to prepare a formal evaluation of the client’s accounting practices.

* * * * *

In many situations, professionals are called upon to play dual roles that require different perspectives. For example, attorneys embroiled in pretrial negotiations may exaggerate their chances of winning in court to extract concessions from the other side. But when it comes time to advise the client on whether to accept a settlement offer, the client needs objective advice.

Professors, likewise, have to evaluate the performance of graduate students and provide them with both encouragement and criticism. But public criticism is less helpful when faculty serve as their students’ advocates in the job market. And, although auditors have a legal responsibility to judge the accuracy of their clients’ financial accounting, the way to win a client’s business is not by stressing one’s legal obligation to independence, but by emphasizing the helpfulness and accommodation one can provide.

Are these dual roles psychologically feasible?; that is, can one person successfully play different roles that require different, and often competing, perspectives? No.

Abstract

This paper explores the psychology of conflict of interest by investigating how conflicting interests affect both public statements and private judgments. The results suggest that judgments are easily influenced by affiliation with interested partisans, and that this influence extends to judgments made with clear incentives for objectivity. The consistency we observe between public and private judgments indicates that participants believed their biased assessments. Our results suggest that the psychology of conflict of interest is at odds with the way economists and policy makers routinely think about the problem. We conclude by exploring implications of this finding for professional conduct and public policy.

Full Paper (PDF)

Read what you’ve been missing. Subscribe to Farnam Street via Email, RSS, or Twitter.

Shop at Amazon.com and support Farnam Street

12